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Member States. With the reform of the Pact, the CAB has 
taken centre stage in the EU ﬁ scal surveillance framework. 
All key ﬁ scal requirements to be met by Member States 
under the provisions of the revised Pact are expressed 
and assessed net of cyclical conditions and one-off and 
other temporary measures.
Unsurprisingly, the ascent of the CAB has attracted an 
increasing degree of attention and, with time, revealed a 
number of shortcomings which would have been pardoned 
for a purely analytical tool, but which raised pressing ques-
tions when the instrument became a reference for deriving 
policy conclusions. In particular, the conceptual beauty of 
the indicator hides a number of practical issues, such as 
the uncertainty attached to the measurement of cyclical 
conditions in real time as well as the assessment of short-
term ﬂ uctuations in the tax content of GDP. The history of 
the SGP includes numerous examples where estimates of 
the CAB have given rise either to discussions between the 
European Commission, the Guardian of the Treaty and the 
EU Member States, or to policy conclusions which, with 
the beneﬁ t of hindsight, turned out to be off the mark.
However, the caveats of the instrument have only margin-
ally affected the loyalty of the economic profession and 
of policymakers, partly because of inertia, but mainly ow-
ing to its striking simplicity, which trades off favourably 
with the costs of higher precision. Moreover, in spite of its 
drawbacks, the CAB still constitutes a better measure of 
the underlying orientation of ﬁ scal policy than the headline 
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Fiscal Policymaking
Love at First Sight Turned into a Mature Relationship
The cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) plays a key role in the EU fi scal surveillance 
framework. It started off in a supporting role in the shadow of the headline defi cit and, before 
long, turned into the linchpin of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. The steep ascent 
was driven by high expectations which, with the passing of time, were only partly met. The 
everyday practice of the EU fi scal surveillance rapidly revealed a number of caveats of the 
CAB which, at times, hampered the effectiveness of fi scal surveillance. This paper provides 
a comprehensive review of the changing fortunes of the CAB in the EU fi scal surveillance 
framework. It portrays its main shortcomings and the way they are dealt with in practice. 
Despite its downsides, which were laid bare almost twen-
ty years ago by Blanchard and others,1 the cyclically ad-
justed budget balance (CAB) remains a key indicator for 
the analysis of ﬁ scal policymaking, in particular in the EU 
ﬁ scal surveillance framework. The users of the CAB, who 
abound in both the academic and policy arena, tend to 
waver between blind love and deep dissatisfaction. This 
paper reviews this “love-hate” relationship. It brings to-
gether insights and lessons related to the implementation 
of the EU ﬁ scal surveillance framework, which constitutes 
a particularly taxing testing ground for the CAB.
The main beauty of the CAB is its aspiration to measure, at 
low costs, the underlying budget balance, that is, the ﬁ s-
cal position net of temporary factors that can be expected 
to even out over time. The CAB is used for several pur-
poses in the analysis and conduct of ﬁ scal policy: (1) to 
decompose a given change in the headline deﬁ cit into a 
discretionary ﬁ scal policy component and a cyclical com-
ponent; (2) to assess ﬁ scal impulse; and (3) to examine the 
sustainability of ﬁ scal policy.
The prominence of the CAB in policymaking, especially 
but not exclusively in the EU, has increased over the years. 
Before the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was revised in 
2005, the CAB had mostly been used as an analytical tool 
to provide a better analysis of the ﬁ scal situation of the EU 
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Barrios, Servaas Deroose, Antoine Deruennes, Vitor Gaspar, István 
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1 O. B l a n c h a rd : Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators, in: 
OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No. 79, 1990; E. M. 
G r a m l i c h : Fiscal Indicators, in: OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers, No. 80, 1990.
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deﬁ cit. However, the initial degree of devotion is now ac-
companied by an increasing awareness of measurement 
issues.
The remainder of this paper provides a brief biographic re-
view of the CAB, covering its origins and main functions. 
It also takes a closer look at the anatomy of the indica-
tor, shedding light on its main components. It then gives 
a detailed account of whether and how the CAB fulﬁ ls its 
purpose in practice. Next it looks into ways to overcome 
the shortcomings of the indicator, while preserving one of 
its main virtues, namely simplicity. Finally, some conclu-
sions are drawn.
Love at First Sight: 
The Virtues and the Anatomy of the CAB
Keynes’ “General Theory” has had a far-reaching impact 
on economic thinking. One of its key contributions was to 
make clear that rigidities in the labour or other markets can 
give rise to unwelcome macroeconomic imbalances, most 
prominently unemployment, which take time to recede. 
Since then, when making sense of economic develop-
ments, economists and policymakers have accepted that 
variations in observed macroeconomic variables such as 
GDP are in part temporary. A large body of literature has 
emerged trying to measure the temporary part of eco-
nomic ﬂ uctuations, primarily in a bid to gauge the scope 
for stabilising output through macroeconomic policies.2
In the realm of ﬁ scal policymaking, the understanding that 
economic ﬂ uctuations are at least partly of a passing na-
ture had an important impact on the assessment of ﬁ scal 
developments. It made clear that nominal budget ﬁ gures 
could not be taken at face value as they concealed two 
types of factors: temporary and permanent ones. Disen-
tangling the two elements to reveal the underlying budg-
et position – in operational terms, the cyclically adjusted 
budget balance (CAB) – was recognised as crucial for ﬁ s-
cal policymaking. The idea was to target a level of the CAB 
which would ensure long-term sustainability of public ﬁ -
nances while at the same time permitting automatic sta-
bilisers to dampen cyclical ﬂ uctuations. However, the use 
of the CAB went beyond the assessment of sustainability. 
The annual change of the CAB also became a common 
measure of discretionary ﬁ scal policy and of the ﬁ scal im-
pulse.
2 Early examples are A. O k u n : Potential GNP: Its Measurement and 
Signiﬁ cance, in: Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statis-
tics Section, American Statistical Association, Washington DC 1962; 
and E. K u h : Measurement of Potential Output, in: The American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1966, pp. 758-776.
Overall, economists and ﬁ scal policymakers were enchant-
ed by the possibilities of the CAB. It was seen as a handy 
instrument which, like an X-ray machine, revealed impor-
tant information to policymakers.3 However, a number of 
practical issues emerged right from the beginning.
The ﬁ rst issue related to the choice of the relevant bench-
mark against which to adjust the headline deﬁ cit for tem-
porary effects. The ﬁ rst attempts to extract the underlying 
budget balance from observed data go back to the 1950s.4  
They showed that the assessment of US ﬁ scal policy in the 
1930s would have changed signiﬁ cantly if, instead of using 
headline ﬁ gures, the budget had been adjusted for the ef-
fect of unemployment. Periods of large deﬁ cits, which had 
worried President Hoover at the beginning of the Great 
Depression, looked less alarming after accounting for the 
temporary budgetary effect of higher unemployment. One 
of the main pitfalls of the full employment surplus was that, 
on average, economies operate below full employment. 
As a result, and in a bid to capture the budget around the 
mid-point of the cycle, full employment was replaced by 
potential output or trend output.
However, the use of potential output, an unobserved vari-
able, did not simplify things in practice. Its calculation is 
ambiguous. A range of methods was deployed, yielding 
diverging estimates which translated to equally diverging 
estimates of the CAB. The fundamental problem of gaug-
ing a benchmark that is intellectually convincing yet unob-
servable has not abated since the early days of the CAB. 
Following the proliferation of the full employment surplus 
and the CAB in the 1970s, and thanks also to the progress 
in statistics and computing technology, new methods have 
been developed to separate macroeconomic and ﬁ scal 
variables into temporary and permanent components. In 
practice, the range of existing methodologies for comput-
ing the CAB boils down to two alternative approaches. The 
ﬁ rst, developed by Blanchard, consists of estimating cy-
clically adjusted measures of expenditures and revenues 
directly from regression-based analysis.5 More recent ap-
plications of this ﬁ rst approach make use of structural VAR 
methodologies and unobserved component models.6
3 A detailed portrayal of the initial faith bestowed in the indicator is pro-
vided in A. S. B l i n d e r, R. S o l o w : Analytical Foundations of Fiscal 
Policy, in: A. S. B l i n d e r, G.F. B re a k , D. N e t z e r, R.M. S o l o w, P.O. 
S t e i n e r  (eds.): The Economics of Public Finance, Washington DC 
1974, The Brookings Institution, pp. 3-115.
4 E.C. B ro w n : Fiscal Policy in the Thirties: A Reappraisal, in: American 
Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 5, 1956, pp. 857-879.
5 O. B l a n c h a rd : Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators, in: 
OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No. 79, 1990.
6 See A. D a l s g a a rd , A. D e  S e r re s : Estimating Prudent Budgetary 
Margins for 11 EU Countries: A Simulated SVAR Model Approach, in: 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 216, 1999; and G. 
C a m b a - M e n d e s , D. R o d r i g u e z - P a l e n z u e l a : Assessment Cri-
teria for Output Gap Estimates, in: ECB Working Paper, No. 54, 2001.
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The Commission Methodology for Calculating the CAB
In the framework of the EU budgetary surveillance, the CAB is derived as CABt = BBt - ε · OGt
where BBt is the nominal budget balance to GDP ratio in year t, ε the budgetary sensitivity parameter and OGt the output gap in 
year t. The output gap is a measure of an economy’s cyclical position and is deﬁ ned as the distance between actual and potential 
output. Potential output can either be derived from purely statistical methods (e.g. the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁ lter) or structural, pro-
duction function-based methods. The reference method for the SGP is a production function approach. It was ofﬁ cially adopted 
by the ECOFIN Council on 12 July 2002. A detailed description of the approach is to be found in Denis et al.1
The overall sensitivity parameter ε is obtained by aggregating the elasticities of individual budgetary items estimated via a meth-
odology developed by the OECD and agreed to by the Output Gap Working Group, a working group of the Economic Policy Com-
mittee. The individual revenue elasticities ηR, i are aggregated to an overall revenue elasticity ηR  weighted by the share of each in 
the total current taxes (Ri / R):
ηR = 
4
ηR, i
Ri  .Σ Ri = 1
As for the expenditure elasticity ηG, it can be expressed as
ηG = ηG,U
GU
G
where ηG,U  is the elasticity of unemployment-related expenditure, again estimated on the basis of the agreed upon 
OECD methodology, and Gu / G is the share of unemployment related expenditure in total current primary expendi-
ture.
As budgetary variables are generally expressed in per cent of GDP, the revenue and expenditure elasticities ηR and 
ηG (which measure the change in the level of a budgetary item with respect to the output gap) are transformed into 
sensitivity parameters as follows:
εR = ηR
R
 , εG = ηG 
G
,
Y Y
where R/Y is the share of current taxes in GDP and G/Y is the share of primary current expenditure on GDP. The difference εR - εG 
yields the sensitivity parameter of the overall budget balance ε used in the equation deﬁ ning the CAB. The empirical estimates of 
the budgetary sensitivity parameters currently in use in the EU ﬁ scal surveillance framework are reported in Table 1. 
1 C. D e n i s , K. M c M o r ro w, W. R o e g e r : Production Function Approach to Calculating Potential Output Growth and Output Gaps – Estimates for 
the EU Member States and the US, in: European Economy, Economic Papers, No. 176, 2002.
The second approach for computing the CAB is a two-
stage procedure: a cyclical component of the budget bal-
ance CC is ﬁ rst estimated and subsequently subtracted 
from the nominal budget BB:
(1) CAB = BB - CC
where all variables are expressed in percentage of GDP. 
This second approach has come out on top in practice 
and is the one generally used by national governments and 
international institutions, including the European Commis-
sion, the OECD, the IMF and the ECB for the purpose of 
budgetary surveillance.
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The estimation of the cyclical component CC requires two 
inputs: (1) a measure of the cyclical position of the econ-
omy generally measured by the output gap, the distance 
between actual and potential output;7 and (2) a measure 
of the link between the economic cycle and the budget, 
summarised by elasticity parameters representing the 
percentage change in budgetary items associated with 
percentage changes in the level of economic activity.
Elasticity parameters are generally derived from national 
tax codes as well as from regression analysis.8
The Disenchantments of Everyday Life: 
The Shortcomings of the CAB
In the early years of the EU ﬁ scal surveillance framework, 
the SGP focused on headline numbers only. With the aim 
of achieving and safeguarding macroeconomic stability, 
7 Generally, the cyclical component CC is derived using an aggregate 
estimate of the output gap. The ECB follows an alternative approach 
involving different output gaps for individual tax and expenditure bas-
es. For a detailed presentation of the ECB method see C. B o u t h e -
v i l l a n , P. C o u r- T h i m a n n , G. Va n  D e n  D o o l , P. H e r n a n d e z 
d e  C o s , G. L a n g e n u s , M. M o h r, S. M o m i g l i a n o  and M. Tu -
j u l a : Cyclically Adjusted Budget Balances: An Alternative Approach, 
ECB Working Paper, No. 77, 2001.
8 Useful references for the estimation of tax elasticities are: C. B o u t h e -
v i l l a n , et. al., op. cit.; P. Va n  d e n  N o o rd : The Size and Role of 
Automatic Stabilizers in the 1990s and Beyond, OECD Economics 
Department Working Paper, No. 230, 2002; N. G i ro u a rd , C. A n d r é : 
Measuring Cyclically-Adjusted Budget Balances for the OECD Coun-
tries, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No. 434, 2005; 
G. Wo l s w i j k : Short- and Long-Run Tax Elasticities. The case of the 
Netherlands, ECB Working Paper, No. 763, 2007.
Member States were required to reach and sustain a ﬁ s-
cal position close to balance or in surplus (CTBOIS) in the 
medium term. Compliance with this CTBOIS requirement 
in terms of (1) the budgetary plans presented in the annual 
updates of the stability and convergence programmes 
and (2) budgetary outcomes was formally assessed on the 
basis of nominal budget ﬁ gures. The CAB, although avail-
able and in use, played only an informal role.9
The difﬁ culties associated with monitoring budgetary 
policy in nominal terms manifested themselves relatively 
quickly. It became apparent that the budgetary “noise” 
stemming from cyclical variations in economic activ-
ity precluded sensible conclusions about the underlying 
thrust of ﬁ scal policy. The CTBOIS objective turned into 
a moving target: it seemed to come within reach one year 
only to walk away the next, depending on prevailing cycli-
cal conditions.
Discontented with the adverse experience in guiding ﬁ scal 
policy towards sustainable medium-term positions, the 
ECOFIN Council, following the November 2002 Commis-
sion Communication “Strengthening the co-ordination of 
budgetary policies”, adopted a report in March 2003 which 
formally changed the status of the CAB.10 The report con-
sidered that compliance with the CTBOIS requirement of 
the SGP should be assessed in cyclically adjusted terms 
9 The only ofﬁ cial reference to the CAB was in the 1998 and 2001 Code 
of Conduct on the content and format of stability and convergence 
programmes deﬁ ning the CAB as a useful working instrument.
10 ECOFIN Council Report 6877/03 of 7 March 2003, endorsed by the 
European Council of March 21 and 22 March 2003.
Table 1
Budgetary Sensitivity Parameters
Revenues Expenditure Budget balance Revenues Expenditure Budget balance
Belgium 0.47 -0.07 0.54 Hungary 0.45 -0.01 0.46
Bulgaria 0.35 -0.01 0.36 Malta 0.35 -0.01 0.36
Czech Republic 0.36 -0.01 0.37 Netherlands 0.39 -0.17 0.55
Denmark 0.50 -0.15 0.65 Austria 0.43 -0.04 0.47
Germany 0.40 -0.11 0.51 Poland 0.33 -0.06 0.40
Estonia 0.29 -0.01 0.30 Portugal 0.41 -0.04 0.45
Greece 0.42 -0.01 0.43 Romania 0.28 -0.02 0.30
Spain 0.38 -0.05 0.43 Slovenia 0.42 -0.05 0.47
France 0.44 -0.06 0.49 Slovakia 0.27 -0.02 0.29
Ireland 0.36 -0.05 0.40 Finland 0.41 -0.09 0.50
Italy 0.49 -0.02 0.50 Sweden 0.48 -0.10 0.58
Cyprus 0.39 -0.01 0.39 United Kingdom 0.40 -0.02 0.42
Latvia 0.26 -0.02 0.28
Lithuania 0.26 -0.01 0.27 Euro area 0.42 -0.06 0.48
Luxembourg 0.48 -0.01 0.49 EU27 0.39 -0.04 0.43
S o u rc e s : OECD, European Commission.
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and that countries with a deﬁ cit must improve their cycli-
cally adjusted budget position and, in the case of euro 
area countries, by a minimum of 0.5% of GDP per year.
While this upgrade from a complementary analytical tool 
to an ofﬁ cial assessment instrument constituted an impor-
tant step forward, the use of the CAB gradually revealed a 
number of pitfalls. Most of these pitfalls had been known 
since the ﬁ scal policy indicator made its debut in policy 
making.11 However, their extent and empirical relevance 
became visible only after the CAB had been put through 
its paces.
Monitoring Fiscal Adjustment
Monitoring the budgetary adjustment may appear to be a 
purely mechanical exercise. The CAB can be calculated 
for subsequent years, and the resulting annual changes of 
the indicator trace improvements or deteriorations in the 
underlying budget balance. For a long time, the common 
practice, including the various stages of the EU surveil-
lance process, was to interpret changes in the CAB as a 
measure of discretionary ﬁ scal policy, that is the budget-
ary impact of ﬁ scal policy measures deliberated by gov-
ernment.12
However, in the early 2000s this practice gave rise to 
disagreement between the European Commission and a 
number of EU Member States exhibiting budgetary slip-
pages compared to previously announced objectives. Na-
tional ﬁ scal authorities maintained that they had stuck to 
their budget plans, insisting that they had not increased 
discretionary spending. The European Commission, con-
versely, inferred from the observed deterioration of the 
CAB that the ﬁ scal stance had become expansionary and 
blamed deviations from plans on discretionary ﬁ scal pol-
icy.
With hindsight, these conﬂ icting interpretations turned out 
to be related to two sets of misperceptions. On the side 
of national governments, medium-term economic growth 
was frequently overestimated, with the implication that 
sustainable revenue levels were overstated as well.13 On 
the side of the European Commission, the interpretation of 
slippages compared to planned CAB ﬁ gures did not dis-
count the fact that shortfalls in potential economic growth 
11 A. B l i n d e r, R. S o l o w, op. cit.
12 The IMF in its World Economic Outlook and the OECD in its Economic 
Outlook regularly comment on ﬁ scal positions in structural terms as 
measured by the CAB, associating changes in the structural deﬁ cit 
with discretionary policy interventions.
13 L. J o n u n g , M. L a rc h : Improving Fiscal Policy in the EU. The Case 
for Independent Forecasts, in: Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No. 47, 2006, 
pp. 491-531.
could also affect the CAB, which is typically expressed as 
a percentage of GDP.
Disagreements over the interpretation of observed chang-
es in the CAB as an indicator of discretionary ﬁ scal policy 
became apparent when examining in detail the budget-
ary execution in order to directly identify the supposedly 
expansionary measures implemented by national govern-
ments. In some cases, none could be identiﬁ ed, or they 
were not sufﬁ ciently strong to account for the slippage ob-
served. This is because whenever potential output turns 
out to be lower or higher than assumed, observed chang-
es in the CAB are off the target even if budgetary plans are 
implemented correctly.14
The discussions about the budgetary adjustments under 
the SGP can be viewed as a reﬂ ection of a latent disagree-
ment about “conditional” as opposed to “unconditional” 
compliance. The initial interpretation of observed changes 
of the CAB was based on the understanding that Mem-
ber States were to deliver the planned adjustment inde-
pendently of macroeconomic conditions. Following the 
2003 downturn, some Member States raised the issue 
of whether compliance should not be interpreted condi-
tionally upon the macroeconomic scenario underpinning 
budgetary targets, rather than unconditionally.
Monitoring the Level of the Underlying Fiscal Position
In the EU ﬁ scal surveillance framework, the assessment 
of the Member States’ ﬁ scal position inter alia addresses 
two key questions: (1) how big is the risk in a given year 
of breaching the 3% of GDP threshold of the Treaty; and 
(2) how distant is the budget balance from the medium-
term objective (MTO) that ensures sustainable public ﬁ -
nances in the long run. In both cases the CAB plays a piv-
otal role. The risk of breaching the 3% of GDP threshold 
is assessed by means of the minimum benchmark, that is 
the level of the CAB which, under normal cyclical ﬂ uctua-
tions, ensures that automatic stabilisers do not push the 
deﬁ cit above the 3% of GDP limit.15 As regards the second 
key question, the SGP explicitly states that the budgetary 
objective to be achieved in the medium term is deﬁ ned in 
structural terms, i.e. net of cyclical, one-off and other tem-
porary factors.16
14 A detailed analytical discussion of this issue is provided by M. L a rc h , 
M. S a l t o : Fiscal Rules, Inertia and Discretionary Fiscal Policy, in: Ap-
plied Economics, Vol. 37, No. 10, 2005, pp. 1135–46.
15 For the technical details of the minimum benchmark, see European 
Commission: Public Finances in EMU – 2004, in: European Economy, 
No. 3, Brussels 2006.
16 Art. 2a of Council Regulation (EC), No. 1466/97, 7 July 1997, on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the sur-
veillance and coordination of economic policies.
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While the CAB has generally been useful in providing an-
swers to both questions, there was one particular episode 
in the implementation of the EU ﬁ scal surveillance frame-
work where, with the beneﬁ t of hindsight, the CAB turned 
out to be inaccurate. In the late 1990s, towards the end 
of the “ICT bubble” and right after the formal inception of 
the SGP, most EU Member States ran comparatively fa-
vourable ﬁ scal positions. This was the result of important 
adjustment efforts implemented in the run-up to the euro 
coupled with high economic growth, which at the time was 
expected to continue over the medium term.17 In addition, 
a number of countries beneﬁ ted from a sort of tax bonanza 
linked to a tax-rich composition of economic activity.
The assessment of public ﬁ nances carried out at the 
time did not point to any major risks vis-à-vis the require-
ments of the SGP. The radar screen of EU ﬁ scal surveil-
lance was clean. CAB ﬁ gures available in real time indi-
cated healthy ﬁ scal positions. In autumn 2000 and still in 
spring 2001, the general government budget net of cycli-
cal factors of both the euro area and the EU were esti-
mated to stay broadly in balance over the two-year fore-
cast horizon. Against this backdrop, and based on the 
assumption that economic growth and high tax returns 
would persist, a number of Member States decided to 
reduce taxes and/or to increase discretionary expendi-
ture. However, the benign assessment of economic and 
ﬁ scal prospects turned out to be a chimera. The burst-
ing of the ICT bubble in the second half of 2001 and the 
17 In 1998-2001, euro area GDP grew on average by around 3% per year. 
In autumn 2000, shortly before the bursting of the ICT bubble, avail-
able forecasts – including the one by the services of the EU Commis-
sion – expected this rate to carry on into the medium term. 
ensuing economic slowdown made it clear that ﬁ scal 
policy plans had been based on an erroneous judgment 
of the underlying situation. Countries like Italy, France 
and Germany suddenly found themselves in a situation 
in which they struggled to stay within the remits of the 
SGP and had no ﬁ scal leeway to lean against the eco-
nomic slowdown.
Ex post, it became clear that the underlying ﬁ scal situa-
tion at the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s was 
not nearly as rosy as assumed at the time: the output 
gap was abundantly positive and the ﬁ scal stance too 
lax. Based on today’s assessment, the 2000 headline 
deﬁ cit recorded for Germany in autumn 2000 would 
have shown an underlying deﬁ cit of close to 2% of GDP 
as compared to less than 1% of GDP at the time. A sim-
ilar story holds for France and Italy (see Figure 1).
An attentive examination of the revision of CAB esti-
mates revealed two weak spots: (1) the assessment of 
potential output and cyclical conditions in real time is 
surrounded by a considerable degree of uncertainty; 
and (2) the elasticity of taxes with respect to GDP can 
be subject to signiﬁ cant ﬂ uctuations.
Starting with the uncertainty surrounding real-time output 
gap estimates, Figure 2 depicts output gap estimates for 
the year 2000 in successive Commission services fore-
casts for three large EU Member States as well as for the 
euro area. In the beginning, that is in real time, estimates 
of the cyclical position did not point to particularly favour-
able economic conditions. Since medium-term growth 
prospects were generally assessed to be very bright, the 
prevailing conditions were taken to be average or slightly 
Figure 1
CAB Estimates for 2000 Across Time: 
Autumn 2000 and Autumn 2008
Figure 2
Output Gap Estimate for 2000 
in Successive Commission Services Forecasts
S o u rc e : Commission Services.
S o u rc e : Commission Services.
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below average.18 With the arrival of new data indicating 
that growth projections for the medium term had been 
rather sanguine, the assessment of cyclical conditions in 
2000 changed signiﬁ cantly.
The uncertainty surrounding real-time estimates of po-
tential output and the output gap is not new. It was ﬁ rst 
empirically explored and discussed in connection with US 
monetary policymaking already in the late 1990s and early 
2000s.19 More recently, similar work was carried out in the 
ﬁ eld of ﬁ scal policy for OECD countries.20 The fundamen-
tal problem in assessing the cycle in real time can be in-
terpreted as a problem of forecasting. In order to make an 
assessment of where in the cycle the economy stands to-
day, it is necessary to make an assumption/forecast about 
where one believes the economy will be in the future.21 The 
inherent uncertainty attached to economic forecasts, and 
in turn to output gap estimates, clearly weighs on the as-
sessment and conduct of ﬁ scal policymaking.
The second Achilles heel of the cyclical adjustment meth-
od used in the EU ﬁ scal surveillance framework is the as-
sumption of constant tax elasticities. As indicated in Fig-
ure 3, the link between the cyclical component of GDP 
and the budget is taken to be invariant over time. Constant 
tax elasticities are an acceptable approximation as long 
18 The economic projections included in the 2003 vintage of the Member 
States’ stability and convergence programme implied a medium-term 
growth rate of around 3% for the euro area. 
19 A. O r p h a n i d e s : Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data, 
in: American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 2001, pp. 964-85.; A. 
O r p h a n i d e s , S. Va n  N o rd e n : The unreliability of output gap esti-
mates in real time, in: Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 84, No. 
4, 2002, pp. 569-83.
20 L. F o r n i , S. M o m i g l i a n o : Cyclical Sensitivity Of Fiscal Policies 
Based On Real-Time Data, in: Applied Economics Quarterly , Vol. 50, 
No. 3, 2005, pp. 299-326; R. G o l i n e l l i , S. M o m i g l i a n o : The Cycli-
cal Response of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area. Why Do Results of 
Empirical Research Differ So Strongly?, in: M. L a rc h  (ed.): Achieving 
and Safeguarding Sound Fiscal Positions, European Economy, Eco-
nomic Paper, No. 377, 2008.
21 The estimate of potential output in year t estimated in the current year 
T generally involves a centred function of actual GDP y or of parts of 
actual GDP: 
 
уt|TP      = b0 +
∞
bj уt-j +
∞
bj уt+jΣ Σ
j = 0 j = 1
 For estimates of potential output in year T or beyond, this involves the 
use of forecasts: 
 Taking the difference between the “ﬁ nal” estimate of potential output, 
the one obtained after the arrival of new data, and the forecast yields
 which shows that the revision of potential output estimates reﬂ ects 
the forecast errors for real GDP.
as short-term variations in the tax content of economic 
growth remain small. In that case, the advantages in terms 
of methodological simplicity clearly outweigh the costs of 
additional precision. However, past experience has shown 
that in some years tax elasticities can depart quite sub-
stantially from their “normal values” (see Figure 3) and 
produce unwelcome effects on the surveillance and con-
duct of ﬁ scal policy.
Concretely, the aforementioned tax windfalls recorded 
during the economic boom of the late 1990s, coupled with 
the use of constant tax elasticities in the calculation of the 
cyclical component of the budget, resulted in an overes-
timation of the underlying budgetary position and, in se-
quence, misled the ﬁ scal authorities in some EU Member 
States to conclude that there was room for tax cuts and/or 
expenditure increases. When tax cuts and expenditure in-
creases turned out to be unsustainable in the subsequent 
years, ﬁ scal reigns had to be tightened in a pro-cyclical 
manner. The ensuing tensions were part of the November 
2003 crisis of the EU ﬁ scal framework which ended with 
the reform of the Pact in 2005.
The renewed rebound of tax elasticities in 2005-2007 
ﬁ lled general governments’ coffers again and triggered a 
number of tax cuts and expenditure increases in the EU 
just before economic growth, along with the tax content of 
economic activity, started to weaken in the wake of the US 
sub-prime residential mortgage market crisis. This time, 
however, the episode did not come as a complete sur-
prise. Surveillance tools were sharpened thanks to the les-
sons from the past, and the Commission services started 
highlighting the potential risks at an early stage.22
22 A ﬁ rst clear message concerning the risks related to the spending of 
revenue windfalls was included in the Commission services 2006 au-
tumn forecast. 
Figure 3
Apparent Tax-to-GDP Elasticity in the Euro Area 
(1996-2008)
S o u rc e : Commission Services.
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One-off and Other Temporary Measures
The abrupt economic slowdown following the bursting of 
the “ICT bubble” in 2001 was the ﬁ rst such episode fol-
lowing the inception of the SGP in Europe in 1999. An-
nual economic growth, which in the euro area had been 
averaging around 3% in 1997-2000, dropped sharply 
and remained subdued, especially in the large euro-area 
countries, through 2004. In the wake of the economic 
downturn, public ﬁ nances quickly started to deteriorate, 
and in a number of Member States the headline deﬁ cit ap-
proached the 3% of GDP threshold of the Treaty. Work-
ing on the rather optimistic assumption that the economy 
would soon return to the steep path of expansion ob-
served at the end of the 1990s, a number of governments 
resorted to temporary deﬁ cit decreasing measures to 
bridge the supposedly short-lived deterioration of public 
ﬁ nances and, more importantly, to stay within the nominal 
limits of the SGP. Typical expedients implemented at the 
time comprised sales of real assets and tax amnesties or 
settlements.23 At times, “ﬁ scal gimmicks” also resulted in 
a stretched interpretation of the ESA95 and EDP account-
ing rules so as to temporarily embellish budgetary ﬁ gures. 
Empirical evidence suggests that after the introduction of 
the EU ﬁ scal framework, reported deﬁ cits became less 
closely linked to debt developments.24 
The relevance of one-off measures went beyond the aca-
demic interest. They were pervasive in terms of the number 
of cases, and their actual budgetary impact was far from 
marginal. Deﬁ cit decreasing one-off measures, excluding 
sales of UMTS licences, could reach 1% of GDP or more 
in a single year. 25
Abstracting from the issue of “creative” accounting, the 
increasing recourse to one-off measures gave rise to a 
number of problems for ﬁ scal surveillance. First and fore-
most, since they were temporary but not cyclical, they im-
paired the CAB as a measure of both the underlying budg-
etary position and of the lasting consolidation effort. For 
instance, revenues from real estate sales, which in some 
cases reached signiﬁ cant levels in successive years, 
23 A detailed analysis of the link between the constraints imposed by the 
SGP and the recourse to one-off and temporary factors is provided 
by  V. K o e n , P. Va n  D e n  N o o rd : Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe: One-
off Measures and Creative Accounting., in: P. W i e r t s , S. D e e ro s e , 
E. F l o re s , A. Tu r r i n i , (eds.): Fiscal Policy Surveillance in Europe, 
Basingstoke 2006, Palgrave McMillan, pp. 45-76. 
24 J. Vo n  H a g e n , G. Wo l f f : What Do Deﬁ cits Tell Us About Debt? 
Empirical Evidence on Creative Accounting with Fiscal Rules in the 
EU, in: Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 30, No. 12, 2006, pp. 3259-
3279; M. B u t i , J. N o g u e i r a  M a r t i n s , A. Tu r r i n i : From Deﬁ cits to 
Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules, in: 
CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1, 2007, pp. 115-152.
25 European Commission: Public Finances in EMU – 2004, in: European 
Economy, No. 3, 2004.
would embellish all key indicators of the EU ﬁ scal surveil-
lance framework, i.e. the headline deﬁ cit, the CAB and the 
change in the CAB, without having a permanent effect on 
the medium-term orientation of public ﬁ nances.
The obvious ﬁ x to exclude one-offs from the CAB was not 
without problems. Leaving aside revenues accruing from 
the sale of UMTS licences, which are one of the few clear 
cases, views frequently diverged with regard to the actu-
al impact of one-off measures over time.26 The difﬁ culty 
in ﬁ nding an encompassing deﬁ nition of one-offs was 
reﬂ ected in the March 2003 European Council conclu-
sions of the November 2002 Commission communication 
“strengthening economic policy coordination”, reporting 
that one-off measures had to be considered “on their own 
merits on a case-by-case basis”.27
Fix It, Don’t Break It: Living with Compromises
In retrospect, the difﬁ culties encountered with the CAB 
materialised bit by bit and were, as highlighted above, 
linked to speciﬁ c economic or policy episodes. At the level 
of the EU ﬁ scal surveillance, the response to gradually 
emerging issues was dominated by a sense of pragma-
tism. Instead of abandoning the CAB altogether, targeted 
attempts were made to better understand the reasons for 
the shortcomings and to look for ways to improve the ac-
curacy of the instrument.
To follow this line of compromise was not always easy. 
Criticism from both academia and ﬁ scal policymakers was 
at times harsh and hinted at scrapping the CAB as a way 
forward. The fact that, at the end of the day, this did not 
happen indicates that there were no viable alternatives, or 
that alternatives would not have been superior. It is rela-
tively undisputed that in a ﬁ scal surveillance framework 
geared towards the achievement of medium-term objec-
tives, the CAB, in spite of its shortcomings, provides bet-
ter guidance than the headline deﬁ cit. After all, it was the 
volatility of the headline numbers that motivated the de-
cision to ditch the nominal budget balance as the ofﬁ cial 
yardstick of ﬁ scal surveillance under the “old” SGP.
A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation illustrates the 
point. In most euro-area countries, the cyclical compo-
nent of aggregate economic activity, as measured by the 
output gap, has exceeded +/- 3% of GDP at least once in 
the past twenty years and has frequently reached levels 
26 By way of example, it was argued that tax amnesties, combined with 
the intention to strengthen tax controls, would produce a permanent 
improvement in the budget. To prove the contrary from an ex ante 
point of view was not always easy.
27 ECOFON Council report on “Strengthening the coordination of budg-
etary policies”, 7 March 2003, 6877/03.
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of more than +/- 1% of GDP. Using the average budgetary 
sensitivity of around 0.5 for the euro area as a whole, the 
nominal budget balance in a given year can include be-
tween 0.5 and 1.5% of GDP of purely transitory elements 
which obstruct the view of the underlying budgetary situ-
ation. Transitory elements of this size preclude a reliable 
judgment on the medium-term orientation of ﬁ scal policy. 
While the actual size of the distortion in real time may be 
somewhat smaller because real-time output gap esti-
mates tend to be of a lower magnitude than those derived 
ex post, the nominal budget balance is deﬁ nitively more 
volatile than the CAB.
Evidently, the successive improvements of the CAB, dis-
cussed in the following sections, have not eliminated all 
caveats. Rather, a workable modus vivendi has been 
found. The enhanced CAB preserves the simplicity of the 
assessment exercise and guarantees a uniform and con-
sistent application across countries. The last point is of 
particular importance in the EU ﬁ scal surveillance where, 
in view of equal treatment, great care is taken to make sure 
the assessment is carried out on the basis of comparable 
data and methods. In addition, the enhanced CAB sharp-
ens the view of potential upside or downside risks to the 
underlying ﬁ scal position of Member States.
Conditional versus Unconditional Fiscal 
Adjustment
Before the 2005 reform, the SGP was not explicit about 
whether targeted ﬁ scal adjustments were to be achieved 
unconditionally, irrespective of macroeconomic condi-
tions, or alternatively whether the adjustment was condi-
tional on the macroeconomic outlook underpinning budg-
etary plans. Discussions in the competent Council com-
mittees in 2004 contributed to clarify technical aspects 
of how conditional compliance with planned budgetary 
adjustments could be implemented in practice. The prin-
ciple of conditionality was ﬁ nally incorporated into the EU 
ﬁ scal surveillance framework with the 2005 reform of the 
Pact. Speciﬁ cally, the report of the European Council of 
20 March 2005, which lays out the foundations of the re-
formed SGP, stresses that policy errors should be clearly 
distinguished from forecast errors in the implementation 
of the excessive deﬁ cit procedure.28
The decision to assess ﬁ scal adjustment in conditional 
terms is not immaterial to the path of budgetary consoli-
dation. As the budgetary impact of unexpected variations 
in growth is not charged to the ﬁ scal authorities’ account, 
28 A detailed overview of the 2005 reform is presented in European Com-
mission: Public Finances in EMU – 2004, in: European Economy, No. 
3, 2005.
the duration of the consolidation process cannot be es-
tablished with certainty. Unexpected departures from 
the projected growth outlook can delay or accelerate the 
budgetary adjustment. This mechanism is made explicit 
in the provisions of the reformed SGP, which foresees the 
repetition of certain steps in the excessive deﬁ cit proce-
dure if effective action has been taken but unexpected ad-
verse economic events have an unfavourable impact on 
government ﬁ nances.29
If appropriately corrected, observed changes in the CAB 
convey relevant information to assess conditional compli-
ance. The correction is needed to account for the effect of 
higher or lower than expected growth on the denominator 
of the CAB. A convenient approximation for the corrected 
ex-post variation in the CAB is given by
(2) ∆CAB t
c orrected = ∆CABt +
Gt-1
S
 (Et-1 ωt - ωt ) .Yt-1
P
Expression (2)30 states that in order to monitor conditional 
compliance, the observed change in the CAB should be 
corrected by adding a term equal to the ratio of non-cy-
clical expenditures over potential output at time t-1 multi-
plied by the forecast error of potential output growth (Et-1 
ωt - ωt ). This correction is based on the assumption that 
ﬁ scal authorities plan non-cyclical expenditures on the 
basis of projected potential output growth and cannot or 
do not adjust expenditure in the execution of the budget to 
account for higher or lower than expected growth. Under 
these assumptions, the adjustment given in (2) effectively 
eliminates variations in the CAB associated with growth 
surprises.
Since the correction term to be applied to the observed 
change in the CAB increases the size of the forecast er-
ror, adjustment for the growth effect can give rise to moral 
hazard. In particular, the adjustment may create an incen-
tive for countries to overestimate growth in order to ob-
tain a greater discount in the assessment of the required 
budgetary adjustment.31 To disclose and maybe prevent 
this risk, the assessment of conditional compliance is to 
be anchored to an unbiased forecast of economic growth. 
29 See Council regulation (EC) No. 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the imple-
mentation of the excessive deﬁ cit procedure.
30 The result is derived in a separate appendix available upon request 
from the authors.
31 Evidence for a systematic tendency in some Member States to over-
estimate potential growth, conﬁ rming the risk of moral hazard, is 
provided in R. S t r a u c h , M. H a l l e r b e rg , J. Vo n  H a g e n : Budget-
ary Forecasts in Europe: The Track Record of Stability and Conver-
gence Programmes, in: ECB Working Paper, No. 307, 2004.; and in L. 
J o n u n g , M. L a rc h , op. cit.
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In practice, the part of that anchor is played by the Com-
mission services forecasts.32
Improving the Assessment of Cyclical Conditions 
in Real Time
One useful way to address the uncertainty attached to 
real-time output gap estimates is to broaden the as-
sessment of cyclical conditions with a battery of com-
plementary indicators that are taken to reﬂ ect cyclical 
developments. The inclusion of complementary indica-
tors is motivated by the observation that in some cases 
the indications of output gap estimates derived from the 
production function method used in the EU ﬁ scal sur-
veillance framework tend to contrast with elements of 
the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. Concretely, 
negative output gap estimates happened to go along 
with increasing rates of inﬂ ation and other aspects which 
are generally observed in economies operating above 
potential.
A ﬁ rst attempt to bring complementary indicators on 
board was made in the 2006/07 assessment round of the 
stability and convergence programmes. The approach 
was purely descriptive and judgmental in nature.33 In a 
bid to make the assessment more systematic, a quanti-
tative method has been tested. It is an extension of the 
commonly agreed upon production function method for 
calculating potential output and the output gap that in-
corporates the degree of capacity utilisation of labour 
and capital.
One of the major difﬁ culties in the commonly agreed 
method is to correctly identify total factor productivity 
(TFP), which generally represents the largest part of GDP 
growth. This is achieved by resorting to the simplifying 
assumption that the existing stocks of capital and labour 
are always fully utilised across different phases of the 
cycle. The price paid for this simpliﬁ cation is straightfor-
ward. To the extent that the degree of capacity utilisa-
tion increases during upswings and decreases in down-
swings, TFP may be overestimated or underestimated, 
which in turn may affect the accuracy of the output gap 
estimates in real time.
32 The accuracy of Commission services growth forecasts is document-
ed in F. K e e re m a n : The Track Record of the Commission Forecast, 
in: European Economy, Economic Paper, No. 137, 1999; and in L. 
J o n u n g , M. L a rc h , op. cit.
33 Commission services’ economic assessment of the 2006/07 vintage 
of stability and convergence programmes includes short paragraphs 
comparing output gap estimates with the indications emerging from 
complementary indicators. The assessments can be found at: ht-
tp://ec.europa.eu/economy_ﬁ nance/netstartsearch/pdfsearch/pdf.
cfm?mode=_m2 
The simplifying assumption of a constant degree of uti-
lisation of capital and labour can be relaxed by making 
use of survey indicators such as the rate of capacity uti-
lisation in the manufacturing sector or indicators of eco-
nomic sentiment. These complementary indicators are 
embedded into the commonly agreed upon production 
function approach, so as to track the variations in the use 
of the existing capital stock during upswings and down-
swings.34
Simulations designed to test the relative merits of such 
an extended production function approach vis-à-vis the 
“standard” approach yield encouraging results (see Fig-
ure 4). Although ﬁ ndings vary across countries, the inclu-
sion of the rate of capacity utilisation or other survey in-
dicators tends on average to reduce the uncertainty sur-
rounding real-time output gap estimates.35
Tracking Short-term Fluctuations of Tax 
Elasticities
Compared to the other caveats of the CAB, tackling short-
term ﬂ uctuations of tax elasticities has so far proved more 
difﬁ cult. While progress has been made on getting a grip 
on the problem, work is still ongoing.
To improve the measurement of tax elasticities in the EU 
ﬁ scal framework and, in turn, to enhance the appraisal 
of the structural budget balance, two separate questions 
have been addressed: (1) what drives the year-to-year 
ﬂ uctuations of tax elasticities, and (2) how important are 
changes in the tax content of growth for the assessment 
of the CAB?
The standard approach established in the literature to un-
derstand the behaviour of tax revenues are econometric 
regressions where annual tax data are linked to measures 
of economic activity and a series of other variables that 
are expected to affect the level of taxation.36 A variant of 
this standard approach was examined by the European 
Commission.37 The variant explicitly allows for composi-
tion effects which lead to a higher- or lower-than-normal 
tax-to-GDP ratio, such as changes in the consumption or 
34 European Commission: Public Finances in EMU – 2008, in: European 
Economy, No. 3, 2008.
35 The extended production function approach does not yet have ofﬁ -
cial status in the EU ﬁ scal surveillance framework. It is currently being 
discussed with the Member States in the competent Council commit-
tees.
36 See for instance R. M o r r i s , L. S c h u k n e c h t : Structural Balances 
and Revenue Windfalls. The Role Of Asset Prices Revisited, ECB 
Working Paper, No. 737, 2007; and G. Wo l s w i j k : Short- and Long-
Run Tax Elasticities. The Case of the Netherlands, ECB Working Pa-
per, No. 763, 2007.
37 European Commission, op. cit.
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wage share of GDP or signiﬁ cant changes in asset and 
commodity prices. The results are encouraging. They 
provide a relatively persuasive account of why the tax 
content of GDP has increased or declined in the past. By 
way of example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
marked increase in the elasticity of current taxes with 
respect to GDP can be attributed to an increase in the 
consumption share of total income in Germany and to a 
combination of a higher wage share, rising imports and 
high asset prices in France.
Although the identiﬁ cation of the drivers of tax elasticities 
is intrinsically useful, as it provides an understanding of 
what lies beneath composition effects, it is not sufﬁ cient 
to understand the impact on the underlying ﬁ scal posi-
tion. In order to assess more precisely whether compo-
sition effects are of a temporary nature or not, it is nec-
essary to analyse the behaviour of individual tax bases. 
A disaggregated approach is crucial because individual 
tax bases, such as household consumption, wages and 
proﬁ ts, may (and in practice do) follow a different pattern 
compared to overall GDP. If all tax bases were fully syn-
chronised with the cyclical ﬂ uctuations of the aggregate 
level of economic activity, composition effects would not 
play a role.
In a bid to disentangle the composition effect into a per-
manent and a temporary part, the European Commis-
sion38 applied a variant of the disaggregated approach 
developed and used by the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB).39 Tax revenues are broken down into four 
categories (indirect taxes, personal income taxes, corpo-
rate income taxes and social security contributions) and 
linked to their corresponding tax bases or approxima-
tions thereof, i.e. household consumption, gross operat-
ing surplus and wages.40 The disaggregated approach 
yields a direct estimate of the CAB by subtracting the 
temporary component from the actual yield of each tax 
category. The difference between the traditional CAB 
and this alternative calculation provides a proxy for the 
impact of composition effects.
An empirical application of this approach to a set of large 
EU countries (Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands) 
in 1996-2007 gives interesting results which are in line 
with expectations. In particular, composition effects had 
a strong and positive impact in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, while they were rather negative in 2003-2006. The 
composition effect was particularly strong in 2000, when 
it implied an overvaluation of several percentage points 
of GDP in the improvement of the CAB in the large EU 
countries considered (see Figures 5 and 6). Needless to 
say that an assessment based on headline deﬁ cits would 
have been even further off the mark.
The lessons to be learned from such an exercise are 
straightforward. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, tak-
ing composition effects into account would have shown 
signiﬁ cantly lower improvements in the structural budget 
balances. Conversely, during the protracted slowdown 
38 Ibid.
39 For a detailed description of the ECB method see C. B o u t h e v i l l a n 
et al., op. cit.
40 The technical details can be found in Part II of European Commission: 
Public Finances in EMU – 2008, in: European Economy, No. 3, 2008.
Figure 4
Comparing Alternative Output Gap Methods
(DE, FR, IT)
S o u rc e : Commission Services.
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underpins the revised SGP.42 In fact, all key requirements 
of the revised SGP, such as the required annual adjust-
ment and the medium-term budgetary objective, are 
deﬁ ned in the cyclically adjusted terms net of one-off 
and temporary measures. The Code of Conduct even in-
cludes a deﬁ nition which states, that “one off measures 
are measures having a transitory effect that does not 
lead to a sustained change in the intertemporal budget-
ary position”.43
In practice, however, ﬁ nding a common understanding 
about one-off and temporary measures was not always 
easy. Because of the relative novelty of the phenomenon, 
there was no established taxonomy to refer to. Apart from 
very obvious cases, such as the sale of UMTS licences, 
each measure had to be assessed individually, which re-
peatedly gave rise to debate. Member States would insist 
that the measures produced permanent effects, whereas 
the European Commission generally took a more cau-
tious view.
Experience accumulated over the years shows that the 
assessment of whether a given measure is to be consid-
ered temporary inevitably involves judgment. However, 
in order to avoid arbitrary decision-making and ensure 
equality of treatment across Member States, the Com-
42 Council report on “Improving the Implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact” was included in the Council conclusions of 23 March 
2005, 7619/1/05 REV 1. 
43 The code of conduct on “Speciﬁ cations on the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and content 
of stability and convergence programmes”, endorsed by the ECOFIN 
Council on 11 October 2005.
following the bursting of the “ITC bubble” in 2001, com-
position effects have excessively darkened the read-
ing of the conventional CAB in some countries, notably 
Germany but also the Netherlands and the UK.
The detailed assessment of government tax revenues 
along the lines outlined above is currently not part of the 
commonly agreed upon EU ﬁ scal surveillance frame-
work. For the moment, the reference method for the as-
sessment of tax revenues remains the one that relies on 
time-invariant elasticities. However, in a bid to achieve 
a better overview of the underlying ﬁ scal situation and 
of ﬁ scal adjustment in the EU Member States, the Com-
mission services are complementing, on an informal 
basis, the standard analysis with a more detailed ap-
proach.41
Accounting for One-off and Temporary Measures
The fourth CAB adjustment relates to temporary ele-
ments of the budget that are not linked to changes in the 
economic environment but result from discretionary de-
cisions taken by ﬁ scal authorities. Once an agreement is 
reached about what “one-off and temporary” measures 
are, they should simply be netted out from the CAB so 
as to reveal the “true” structural budgetary position. The 
importance of abstracting from one-off and temporary 
measures when assessing ﬁ scal performance was ac-
knowledged in the Council report of March 2005, which 
41 A ﬁ rst step in this direction was presented in European Commission, 
op. cit.
Figure 5
Impact of Composition Effects on the Change in the 
CAB (1996-2007)
S o u rc e : Commission Services.
Figure 6
Change in the CAB: 
“Standard” and Corrected for Composition Effects
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cal surveillance framework, where it has gained “ofﬁ cial 
status” with the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) in 2005. In clear contrast to the SGP mark I, which 
focused on headline ﬁ gures, most of the requirements 
of the revised Pact are expressed in cyclically adjusted 
terms.
In the beginning, great hopes were attached to the change 
in focus. The expectation was that by removing cyclical 
elements from the budget, one would get a clearer view 
of the actual ﬁ scal situation of a country and derive more 
robust policy conclusions. Such expectations developed 
in the wake of the rather difﬁ cult experience with a ﬁ scal 
surveillance structure based on nominal ﬁ gures. A coun-
try that seemed to be close to or steadily moving towards 
the target of a balanced budget one year, would suddenly 
ﬁ nd itself off track when cyclical conditions changed. In 
light of this, all eyes turned to the CAB, which seemed to 
offer the virtues headline ﬁ gures were lacking.
Unfortunately, the honeymoon effect did not last long. 
A number of frictions emerged in the new relationship: 
it turned that the CAB did not always provide accurate 
signals of Member States’ ﬁ scal performance. Neverthe-
less, instead of abandoning the CAB in a rage of frus-
tration, efforts were made to understand and correct 
the weaknesses. This outcome reﬂ ects the awareness 
that reverting to a ﬁ scal surveillance system centred on 
headline deﬁ cits would not improve things. It also reﬂ ects 
the understanding that some of the problems encoun-
tered in the use of the CAB are probably, in the spirit of 
Goodhart’s law, intrinsic to any rules-based surveillance 
framework, rather than to the indicator itself. In this re-
spect, it was understood that improving the CAB would 
be the way forward.
Thanks to the improvements achieved over the years, 
a much better and more accurate understanding of the 
virtues and vices of the CAB prevails today. Progress 
has been made in the identiﬁ cation and measurement of 
Member States’ ﬁ scal efforts, the measurement of cycli-
cal conditions in real time and the assessment of tax de-
velopments. Some of these improvements have been of-
ﬁ cially incorporated in the surveillance framework, such 
as the concept of conditional versus unconditional com-
pliance with ﬁ scal plans or the understanding that ﬁ scal 
adjustments need to be assessed net of one-off meas-
ures and other temporary measures. Other methodologi-
cal advances, notably the assessment of composition ef-
fects of government taxes and the use of complementary 
indicators for the real-time assessment of the output gap, 
have as yet an informal status but are used by the Com-
mission services to form a well-informed view of budget-
ary developments.
mission, in collaboration with the competent committees 
of the Council, has agreed upon a number of principles.44 
The following common features are to be taken into ac-
count:
As a general principle, only measures having a sig-• 
niﬁ cant impact on the general government balance 
should be considered, whereby signiﬁ cant is meant to 
be above the level of one decimal point of GDP.
The temporary nature of a ﬁ scal measure is born out • 
by its impact on the general government budget bal-
ance over time; i.e. the impact is to be concentrated in 
one single year or a very limited number of years.
One-offs and temporary measures are non-recurrent • 
and should be assessed in the context of a sequence 
of related measures. For instance, although each in-
vestment project is unique, they are to be seen in the 
context of a continuity of established investment deci-
sions over time.
Deﬁ cit-increasing measures should not be counted as • 
one-offs and, hence, not be excluded from the CAB. 
The assessment of the non-recurring nature of certain 
expenditures is particularly difﬁ cult. Measures intend-
ed to be temporary often become permanent.
Although the above elements do not allow for an exhaus-
tive identiﬁ cation of one-off and temporary measures, 
they serve as guidelines to make sure that a case-by-
case assessment follows consistent principles.
On top of such guidelines, the following indicative list of 
deﬁ cit-reducing one-off measures has emerged: tax am-
nesties involving one-off payment by taxpayers; sales of 
non-ﬁ nancial assets (real estate, public owned licences 
and concessions); securitisation operations with a positive 
impact on the general government budget balance; tempo-
rary legislative changes in the timing of outlays or revenues 
with a positive impact on the general government budget 
balance; exceptional revenues from state-owned com-
panies with a positive impact on the general government 
budget balance; exceptional revenues linked to the transfer 
of pension obligations; and changes in revenues or expen-
ditures following a Court’s or other authority’s rulings.
Conclusions
The cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) is a com-
monly used ﬁ scal indicator. It is also used in the EU ﬁ s-
44 European Commission: Public Finances in EMU – 2004, in: European 
Economy, No. 3, 2006.
